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Introduction
The increasing popularity of multi-database technology, such as communication networks and distributed, federated and homogeneous multi-database systems, has led to the development of many large distributed transaction databases for real world applications. However, for the purposes of decision-making, large organizations would need to mine these distributed databases located at disparate locations. Moreover, the Web has rapidly transformed into an information flood, where individuals and organizations can access free and accurate information and knowledge on the Internet while making decisions. Although this large data assists in improving the quality of decisions, it also results into a significant challenge of efficiently identifying quality knowledge from multi-databases [1, 2] . Therefore large corporations might have to confront the multiple data-source problem. For example, a retail-chain with numerous franchisees might wish to collaboratively mine the union of all the transactional data. The individual transactional databases contain information regarding the purchasing history of the same set of common customers transacting through e-commerce portals or brick and mortar stores. However, the bigger challenge of such computations is compliance to stringent privacy requirements laid down by the formulation of laws such as HIPAA [3] . These regulatory policies are the driving force behind the growing consciousness towards the protection of privacy of individuals and their data. Consequently, there has been a paradigm shift towards the creation of a privacy-aware infrastructure, which entails aspects ranging from data-collection to analysis [4] . Conventionally, data mining has been applied to the traditional data warehouse model of a central data repository, and conducting analysis on it. However, privacy considerations prevents this generic approach and hence privacy preserving data mining has gained recognition among academia and organizations as an important and unalienable area, especially for highly sensitive data such as healthrecords. Indeed, if data mining is to be performed on these sensitive datasets, due attention must be given to the privacy requirements. Recently there has been a spate of work addressing privacy preserving data mining [5, 6] . This wide area of research includes classification techniques [7] , association rule mining [8] , and clustering [9] with privacy constraints. In early work on privacy-preserving data mining, Lindell and Pinkas [10] propose a solution to privacy-preserving classification problem using oblivious transfer protocol, a powerful tool developed by SMC research. The techniques based on SMC for efficiently dealing with large data sets have been addressed in [11] , where a solution to the association rule mining problem for the case of two parties was proposed. In [12] , a novel secure architecture has been proposed where the security and accuracy of the data mining results are guaranteed with improved efficiency. Traditionally, Secure Multi-Party Protocols have been used for the secure computation for generic functions. A Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) problem deals with computing any function on any input, in a distributed network where each participant holds one of the inputs, while ensuring that no more information is revealed to a participant in the computation than can be inferred from that participants input and output. Secure two party computation was first investigated by Yao [13, 14] and was later generalized to multi-party computation (e.g. [15] [16] [17] ). It has been proved that for any polynomial function, there is a secure multiparty computation solution [16, 17] . The approach used is as follows: the function f to be computed is firstly represented as a combinatorial circuit, and then the parties run a short protocol for every gate in the circuit. Every participant gets corresponding shares of the input wires and the output wires for every gate. While this approach is appealing in its generality and simplicity, the protocols it generates depend on the size of the circuit. This size depends on the size of the input (which might be huge as in a data mining application), and on the complexity of expressing f as a circuit (for example, a naive multiplication circuit is quadratic in the size of its inputs). However, the complexity of such a secure protocol is prohibitive for complex data mining tasks such as the discovery of sequential patterns.
In this paper, we present an alternative privacy preserving data mining approach -PriPSeP, for discovering sequential patterns in the local databases of a large integrated organization. PriPSeP is useful for mining sequential patterns via collaboration between disparate parties, employing secure architecture, operations and underlying protocols. Hence, to counter the communication and bandwidth overhead of the Oblivious Transfer required between two-parties in an SMC, this paper proposes an alternate architecture consisting of "semi-honest" and "non-colluding" sites. This tradeoff between security and efficiency is reasonable as none of the participating sites are privy to the intermediate or the final results of the calculus. Furthermore, due to the uniform random noise in the datasets, private information of any individual is also guarded from any possible leak.
Organization: The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 goes deeper into presenting the problem statement and provides an extensive description of the problem at hand. Section 3 describes our proposed solution with the description of the architecture and the algorithms for secure multi-party protocols. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper with a roadmap for future work as well as new trends on privacy preseving sequential pattern mining approaches.
Problem Statement
In this section we give the formal definition of the problem of privacy preserving collaborative sequential pattern mining. First, we give a brief overview of the traditional pattern mining problem by summarizing the formal description introduced in [18] and extended in [19] . Subsequently, we extend the problem by considering distributed databases. Finally, we formally define the problem of privacy preserving sequential pattern mining.
Mining of Sequential Patterns
Let DB be a database containing a set of customer transactions where each transaction T consists of a customer-id, a transaction time and a set of items involved in the transaction. Let I = {i 1 , i 2 ...i m } be a set of literals called items. An itemset is a non-empty set of items. A sequence s is a set of itemsets ordered according to their timestamp.
It is denoted by < s 1 s 2 ...s n >, where s j , j ∈ 1...n, is an itemset. In the rest of the paper we will consider that itemsets are merely reduced to items. Nevertheless all the proposal could be easily extended to deal with itemsets. A k-sequence is a sequence of k items (or of length k). A sequence S =< s 1 s 2 ... s n > is a subsequence of another sequence S =< s 1 s 2 ... s m >, denoted S ≺ S, if there exist integers i 1 < i 2 < ... i j ... < i n such that s 1 ⊆ s i1 , s 2 ⊆ si 2 , ... s n ⊆ si n . All transactions from the same customer are grouped together and sorted in increasing order and are called a data sequence. A support value (denoted supp(S)) for a sequence gives its number of actual occurrences in DB. Nevertheless, a sequence in a data sequence is taken into account only once to compute the support even if several occurrences are discovered. In other words, the support of a sequence is defined as the fraction of total distinct data sequences that contain S. A data sequence contains a sequence S if S is a subsequence of the data sequence. In order to decide whether a sequence is frequent or not, a minimum support value (denoted minsupp) is specified by the user, and the sequence is said to be frequent if the condition supp(S) ≥ minsupp holds. Given a database of customer transactions the problem of sequential pattern mining is to find all the sequences whose support is greater than a specified threshold (minimum support). Each of these represents a sequential pattern, also called a frequent sequence. The anti-monotonic Apriori property [20] holds for sequential patterns [21] . Since its introduction, more than a decade ago, the sequential pattern mining problem has received a great deal of attention and numerous algorithms have been defined to efficiently find such patterns (e.g. GSP [19] , PSP [22] , PrefixSpan [23] , SPADE [24] , FreeSpan [25] , SPAM [26] , CLOSPAN [27] , PRISM [28] , SAMPLING [29] , etc.).
From Collaborative to Privacy Preserving Sequential Pattern Mining
Let DB be a database such as DB = DB 1 DB 2 ... DB D . We consider that all databases DB 1 , DB 2 ... DB D share the same number of customers (CIDs), which is N . We also consider that for each customer in the databases, the number of transaction times (TIDs), K, is the same. Our data representation scheme considers that all transactions are depicted in the form of vertical bitmaps, which we denote as vectors for clarity in mathematical formulae. 
v={1..K} corresponds to the transaction list of the customer u, from the database DB j and the item i. It is a K length bit string that has the v th bit as one if the customer has bought the item i from the database DB j .
Given a set of databases DB 1 , DB 2 ...DB D containing customer transactions, the problem of collaborative sequential pattern mining is to find all the sequences whose support is greater than a specified threshold (minimum support). Furthermore, the problem of privacy-preserving collaborative sequential pattern mining is to find all the sequential patterns embedded in the set of databases by considering parties do not want to share their private data sets with each other. In order to illustrate this further, let us consider the following example.
Example 1 Let us consider an example of three retail franchisees Alice, Bob and Carol wishing to extract securely the sequential patterns without disclosing the identities of any individual customers. Each item is provided with its timestamp (C.f. table 1).
(1)2 (7)3 Table 1 . An example of distributed databases Let us assume that the minimal support value is set to 50%. From the three distributed databases, we can infer that item (1) is not frequent in any one of the individual databases. However, by considering the union of all databases (C.f. table 2 where the superscript depicts the original database where the item is derived), we obtain the sequence of < (1)(2)(3) >. By considering privacy, this sequence has to be obtained by considering Alice, Bob and Carol do not want to share their private data sets with each other.
In, [30] , Zhan et al. have proposed a novel approach, which entails the transformation of the databases of each collaborating party, followed by a protocol, which results in the preservation of privacy, as well as the correct results. Theoretically, the approach is robust and secure, however, it has serious limitations relating to the initial constraints considered while developing the protocol. It has been assumed that each of the collaborating party carries a unique inventory. For instance, considering our previous example and our problem statement, and following the previous approach and not taking into account the possibility of items being shared among the distributed parties, we come up with erroneous
results. An item such as (1) which is not supported by enough customers in one individual database might not appear in the final results. This assumption causes serious limitation for different real applications where items sharing between different databases is imperative and a fundamental requirement as proved earlier. Moreover, the same customer buying the same item twice from the same database but on different times is not permissible, employing their new data representation scheme for sequential data. The other drawback of mapping each item to a unique code is the additional overhead incurred while sorting the databases.
The PriPSeP approach
In this section, we propose our novel approach for privacy preserving sequential pattern mining in distributed and collaborative databases. A preliminary version of this proposal has been published in [31] . Firstly we focus only on collaborative sequential pattern mining in order to clearly explain our methodology. This approach is extended in the next section in order to consider privacy requirements and finally we propose a new algorithm and underlying protocols within the secure architecture.
Collaborative sequential pattern mining
An overview As previously seen in Section 2, the main difficulty with collaborative mining is that we have to deal with different databases where the order of items is not known beforehand (e.g. consider the item (7) of the CID 1 in the Bob's database is before the item (3) of the Alice's database).
For brevity, we consider that we are provided with a Data Miner performing the generating and verifying phases of candidate sequences as Apriori-like algorithms. We assume that the candidate generation is performed in conventionally by combining the k-1 frequent sequences in order to generate k-candidate sequences (e.g. C.f. GSP [19] generation phase). We extend the verification phase as follows. First, we consider that our data representation scheme has been extended from the SPAM algorithm [26] , wherein for efficient counting, each customer's transactions are represented by a vertical bitmap. These bitmap or vectors are vertically aligned for various computations to calculate the support value for any sequence. As we have to deal with disparate distributed databases, we assume that the Miner could request the N original databases in order to obtain a vector corresponding to the specific item i, i.e. V
for any candidate sequence. Let us consider that we are provided with two databases, namely DB 1 and DB 2 . These databases contain three customers and each customer has five transaction times or CIDs. Let us consider that we are in the candidate step counting of an Apriori-like algorithm. Let us assume that we are currently finding how many times the sequence < (1)(2) > appears in the set of all customers of the two databases. First, we extract from DB 1 , the vector corresponding to the item . From the given vectors, two key operations have to be performed: (i) merge the two vectors, and then (ii) transform the result in order to check if they it could followed by (2). These two vectors are merged together by applying a bitwise operator (∨):
. For the second operation, similar to the S-Step process of the SPAM algorithm we consider a function that transforms the vector or bitmap. For each customer, following the occurrence of the first bit with value one, every subsequent bit in the vector is flagged as one. However, since we have to deal with different databases and due to efficiency considerations, we consider that these two operations are performed through the f function defined below and thus we obtain a new vector
Definition 2 Let us consider a vector V j i for a database j and an item i. V j i is defined as follows:
). K stands for the number of TIDs and N corresponds to the number of CIDs. For brevity, we denote this vector as
For each u ∈ {1..N }, we have:
where ∨ are bitwise operators. We can notice that
For each u ∈ {1..N }, we have: g c (C u ) = 1 if it exists at least one 1 in the customer transactions, i.e. customer dates, or 0 otherwise. We can notice that Card(g(V )) = N .
In conjunction to the computation of the function f , the vectors corresponding to the item (2) are extracted from DB 1 and DB 2 (V 1 2 and V 2 2 respectively). Subsequently, similar to the previous step the vector (
Following that, the bitwise operator ∧ is used to calculate Z 1 ∧ Z 2 and the count for each customer, for the sequence < (1)(2) > has to be calculated. This is performed by the g function, i.e.
2 )). As the resulting vector Z 3 has a cardinality corresponding to the number of customers, the last operation to be performed is a summation of the number of 1's in the vector Z 3 . This is performed by the operation.
The collaborative support counting algorithm The Collaborative Frequency algorithm (see Algorithm 1) has been developed as follows. For each item i of the candidate sequence to be tested, a new vector X i is generated by applying the ∨ bitwise operator on all vectors from the original databases. Then by considering the result of the previous operation, the f function is applied, followed by the bitwise operator ∧ for each item. At the end of this iteration, a new vector Z of cardinality N × K is produced. Subsequently, the g function is applied to the intermediate result for generating a vector of cardinality N , i.e. Y . Finally, the number of bits which are 1 in Y are summated to compute the final value of support.
Algorithm 1: The Collaborative Frequency algorithm
Data: S = < it1 ... itq > a sequence to be tested; DB = DB1 DB2... DBD a set of databases; N the number of customers shared by all databases; K the number of date shared by all customers of all databases. Result: The support of the sequence S in DB.
Complexity: Let V s = N × K be the size of the vectors which are sent and S be the candidate sequence to be verified. The main transfers that are performed by the algorithm are: (V s × D × S) for and (V s × S) for both the f function and operation. There are (N (K − 2)) computations performed by f . If f is already available, i.e. precomputed and stored, we have (N ) operations otherwise (N (K − 1)) operations are performed by g.
From collaborative to privacy-preserving sequential pattern mining
A brief overview of the architecture In this section we describe an architecture where secure multi-party techniques developed in the cryptographic domain can be easily extended for data mining purposes. Previous work [16] has described that Secure Multi-Party protocols can be used directly to solve with total security, any generic data mining task. However, the tradeoff is the complexity of the protocol and the requirements that all parties need to be online during the entire duration of the lengthy process. Hence, it is potentially unviable for complex data mining tasks, particularly for cases with a large number of participants. The communication complexity prohibits efficient scalability and for situations that all parties cannot remain online for the entire process, the SMC protocols are rendered useless. Evidently traditional approaches do not fulfill the requirements of a complex sequential mining algorithm. Hence, as proposed in [12] , we deploy a safe architecture for performing the data mining task without leaking any useful or sensitive information to any of the intermediate parties. These independent sites collect, store and evaluate information securely. PriPSeP requires three non colluding and semi honest [16] sites which follow the protocol correctly but are free to utilize the information collected by them. They are also referred to as honest but curious sites. The detailed functions of each of these sites are described:
-Data Miner Site DM : The Data Miner is a randomly chosen collaborator between original databases. Its purpose is to interact with N C 1 and N C 2 , and it receives the final result of the computation from the PS. Let us consider Figure 2 illustrating the sites. The operations are described as follows. Initially the following preprocessing steps are performed on the databases individually:
1. Each database DB 1 , DB 2 ...DB D adds ε customers with fake transactions and employ a non-secure counting strategy (this count could be performed by any conventional algorithm since this step is independent of the privacy) to note the number of customers, ε , that have to be pruned from the final result. At the end of the preprocessing we are provided with databases having fake customer transactions and permuted list of vertically aligned vectors. Subsequently, the Data Miner can apply an Apriori-like algorithm as previously mentioned in Section 3.1. This step is immediately followed by the counting phase. For simplicity, let us consider that we are counting the value of support for the two length sequence < (1)(2) >. Now, each database DB j sends its V j 1 vector to N C 1 and N C 2 (dashed arrows numbered 1 in figure 2 ). In order to minimize the risk of network transfers, we propose a hypothetical function Send S × DB d (it) which securely transmits the item vector V it from database DB d to N C 1 and N C 2 . Furthermore, in order to make sure that N C 1 and N C 2 receive minimal information, for each database DB i , we calculate a vector: Z DBi = V it R DBi and send either Z DBi to N C 1 and R DBi to N C 2 or vice versa. It has been proved in [6] , that any data mining task (h) defined on a vector X = [x 1 , x 2 , ...x n ], it suffices to evaluate h(X R) = h(X) since R = [r 1 , r 2 , ...r n ] and X R = [x 1 ⊕ r 1 , x 2 ⊕ r 2 , ...x n ⊕ r n ]. In this case, for N C 1 and N C 2 sites we have some R DBi vectors and since the other vectors are XOR-ed with a random vector, they are indistinguishable from a uniform random distribution. Similar to Algorithm 3.1, the bitwise operator (∨) has to be applied between every vector. As these vectors are shared by N C 1 and N C 2 , we consider a new protocol S (arrows numbered 2 in Figure 2 ) aiming at computing a bitwise OR between the different vectors. This is performed by sending XOR-ed randomized values from N C 1 and N C 2 to P S. Then P S also garbles the resulting vectors in order to divide the result between N C 1 and N C 2 . The calculation continues by computing the f and g functions (subsequently referred to as f S and g S ) in a similar way and results are also stored between N C 1 and N C 2 (arrows numbered 3 in Figure 2 ). Finally, in order to compute the number of bits which are in 1 ( function, now termed as S ), N C 1 and N C 2 collaborate to append their resultant vector with randomized values and then reorder the new vector. P S then calculates the summation of the number of bits and returns part of the result to N C 1 and N C 2 . N C 1 removes the initial random noise and then return this final result to the Data Miner (arrows numbered 4 in Figure 2 ). At this step, DM only has to combine the result from N C 1 and N C 2 and then remove the ε value corresponding to random customers added in the preprocessing phase.
In the following sections, we will explain in detail the various protocols, functions and algorithms necessary for PriPSeP. Firstly, we introduce some notations that are used for describing the algorithms. As our functions employ bitwise operators, we first present new protocols for securely performing bitwise operations. Continuing, we will show how the functions f , g and are extended to f S , g S and S respectively to incorporate security aspects. Finally, we present the Secure Collaborative Frequency algorithm. As the main goal of our approach is to preserve privacy of the individual users and do not divulge any information about the final result to any of the sites, we will show that at the end of the process, N C 1 , N C 2 and P S will only learn a upper bound on the support count of sequences and will not have any information about the private inputs of any of the individual customers.
Notations
In the next subsections, we will consider the following notations. Let 1. NC1 and NC2 mutually generate and exchange four random bits R1, R2, S1 and
2. NC1 sends X1 and Y1 to P S. 3. NC2 sends X2 and Y2 to P S. 4. P S calculates C = (X1 ⊕ X2) (Y1 ⊕ Y2) and a random bit RPS. 5. P S sends APS = C ⊕ RPS to NC1 and BPS = RPS to NC2 (or vice versa).
NC1 calculates
The S and S protocols In this section, we define two basic algorithms S (see Algorithm 2) and ¬ S (see Algorithm 3) providing the protocol which is used to compute securely the bitwise operators from two bits. The S is obtained from the logical equation A B = ¬(¬A ¬B) calculated by using the secure operators S and ¬ S . The fundamental principle that the algorithms operate upon is the addition of uniform random noise to the data which can be removed from the result by the data-owners. The protocol initiates with both N C 1 and N C 2 perturbing their data by XOR-ing it with random values. Subsequently, the randomized data is sent (e.g. for N C 2 , X 2 = − X ⊕R 2 and Y 2 = − Y ⊕S 2 ) to P S, which can calculate the securely. It actually operates on the randomized inputs and calculates C = (X 1 ⊕ X 2 ) (Y 1 ⊕ Y 2 ). It then also adds random noise to the intermediate results in order to avoid N C 1 or N C 2 having the complete result. At the end of the protocol, non colluding sites can then calculate the final result for their own part by removing the initial noise. For instance, for N C 1 , the following operation:
could be done securely since it knows its own inputs (
Y , R 1 and S 1 ) and random numbers from N C 2 (R 2 and S 2 ). Hence, the final results
Substituting the value of A P S and B P S , the initial and intermediate random numbers are removed due to the boolean property R P S ⊕ R P S = 0. The desired result is
Although, this operation is never performed, the symmetrically divided result lies with both N C 1 and N C 1 . More importantly, the Processing Site receives no information regarding to the private inputs of any individual. Due to the randomization performed during the initial step, it just sees a stream of uniformly distributed values, and cannot distinguish between a genuine and a random value. Result:
Remark: roles of NC1 and NC2 may be exchanged.
Theorem 1
The operand S prohibits N C 1 from learning N C 2 's private data and vice versa. Moreover, the third party P S learns none of their private inputs.
Proof : From the protocol, B P S is all that N C 2 learns related to the private data of N C 1 . Due to the randomness and secrecy of R P S , N C 2 cannot find out the values of
As the roles of N C 1 and N C 2 are interchangeable, the same argument holds for N C 1 not learning the private inputs
However, one key security aspect of not leaking any information to P S is achieved by randomizing the inputs before transmitting them to the Processing Site.
Remark:
The privacy theorem is obvious for the ¬ S operator as no data is exchanged.
Complexity: For the S operator, nine computations have to be performed (6 and 3 ). As, two more ¬ S operations are needed by the S protocol, we have in total, eleven computations. For each , N C 1 and N C 2 exchange 2 × 2 bits among each other. From N C 1 or N C 2 , 2 × 1 bits are sent to P S and one bit returned. Furthermore, both N C 1 and N C 2 calculate 2 random bits while 1 random bit is generated by P S.
The f S , g S and S functions In this section, we extend the f and g functions in order incorporate security (see Algorithm 4) . As previously mentioned, the SPAM algorithm's S-step Process requires that the vectors corresponding to every customer contain all 1's after the date of the first transaction for that customer. Hence, the f S function recursively employs the S function to securely compute the resultant vector. The inputs of the function are the randomly distorted customer data and the secure S is used to find the boolean OR between the successive bits residing at the two sites N C 1 and N C 2 . Similar to the previous algorithms, the final result of the operation is split into two parts with the 
Processing Site oblivious of the correct answer. Similarly, the g S function (see Algorithm 5) securely computes the existence of at least '1' in the vector of each customer transaction. It replaces the customer vector to either a '0' or a '1' depending on whether the sequence is supported at least once. This function is useful in calculating the support value at the penultimate step of the Algorithm 7.
Remarks: In fact, calculating g S (
Yi can easily be obtained from (
Zi×K+K ) by using the following relation: (
Algorithm 6: The S protocol
Data: Vectors of bits (X1|X2). X1 is coming from NC1 and X2 is coming from NC2. Result: A number which is shared in two parts: (NB1|NB2) corresponding to the number of bits at 1 in vectors (X1 X2).
1. NC1 and NC2 generate and exchange two random vectors R1 and R2 of same cardinality such as (Card(R1) = Card(R2) ≥ 2N ). They both calculate R1 R2 and calculate the number of 1s to be deleted, NR, at the end of the computation from P S. 2. NC1 and NC2 reorder respectively the vector (X1, R1) and (X2, R2) using a permutation value ϕ and get respectively Y1 and Y2. 3. NC1 sends Y1 to P S and NC2 sends Y2 to P S.
P S calculates Y1
Y 2 and count the number of bits at 1 and gets NB. 5. P S gets a random number RPS and returns N1 = NB + RPS to NC1 and N2 = NB − RPS to NC2. 6. NC1 computes NB1 = N1 − NR, NC2 keeps only NB2 = N2.
Complexity: In Algorithm 6, the number of bits is increased by a value ≥ 2N for security reasons. Let us consider that we set this value as follows t =∈ [2..K]. For N C 1 and N C 2 , (2N (2t + 1) ) operations are performed while (2N (t + 1)) operations on P S. 
item i of the sequence to be tested, all noisy vectors are sent by Send S to N C 1 and N C 2 in order to securely apply an OR between each vector ( S ). The f Proof : The first randomization is performed by the original databases while inserting fake transactions, i.e. ε, and permuting the list customers according to the value of ϕ. As, DM is elected from the original databases, this information about the noise is available to DM and hence can easily be removed. The second randomization is performed by N C 1 and N C 2 while sending the transaction vectors to P S for the secure computation of S , S , f S and g S . This added noise is removed at the end of each computation from N C 1 and N C 2 when they receive results from P S by performing an XOR operation with the initial random values. Moreover, we have also proved that no private information about any individual could be learnt by any of the sites (C.f. Theorem 1). Finally, for the computation of the S function, N C 1 and N C 2 add random noise in their data, i.e. N R , and also permutate their vector according to a ϕ value. P S also randomizes its integer value and this noise is removed by sending opposite parts to N C 1 and N C 2 . The N R value is removed by N C 1 and N C 2 when returning the result to DM . Finally, when combining results from N C 1 and N C 2 , the only operation to be performed by DM to know the real result is to remove the ε previously inserted. Complexity: In the secure protocol, each database has to send 2N K data bits instead of N K. Subsequently, each DB has to calculate N K random bits and perform (N K)
operations. According to the previous results on the number of operations performed by the secure operators, the time complexity is O(12N K) for binary operations and O(7N ) for randomizing operations. Hence, it could be bounded by O(20N ). Let us now consider the communication complexity of the protocol. Let p = D × S × N × K. If the number of operations is at most O(12p), then the number of transfers required is at most O(4p) and for random values it is O(3p). Hence, the whole algorithm has to send at most O(20p). Remarks: The secure architecture could be further redefined in order to improve the communication cost between N C 1 , N C 2 and P S. Furthermore, all the functions except f S (it operates on individual customers), could be parallelized. The total overhead incurred by our secure protocol could be easily reduced by a factor of two. We notice, that by considering SMC protocols, no such optimizations are possible, and hence for scalability issues, our alternative approach could be beneficial.
Security of the protocol For analyzing the security, let us examine the information divulged to each site participating in the protocol. Note that during the entire process, the random numbers are securely generated and the communication infrastructure is robust and intrusion free.
-N C 1 and N C 2 View: During the execution of the protocol, both sites only see a stream of random values with a uniform distribution. By the proposed protocol, they only receive noisy data and noisy shared results. Also N C 1 and N C 2 cannot share information as per the definition of semi-honest noncolluding sites. The value received from the DBs are Xored with random numbers from a uniform distribution and indistinguishable from real values. -PS View: It performs the computation of secure operations (
) and provides the results to N C 1 and N C 2 . As discussed earlier all of these operations reveal no private data of any individual customer from any of the collaborating DBs. Even a succession or sequence of the secure operations remains secure. -Overall Security: During the entire algorithm, no site obtains any additional information beyond of what they are already authorized to learn.
Hence security and privacy of every customer is maintained during the computation of support in the architecture. The addition of fake transactions during the preprocessing steps and permutation of the lists enable that each site is ignorant of the correct intermediate results as well as the final result.
3.3 Improving the robustness of the system
As described in the previous algorithms, all the data are stored in the two non colluding sites N C 1 and N C 2 . If a malicious party gains access to both sites, it will be trivial to obtain all the information and hence violate the tenets of privacy. Thus, in order to improve the robustness of the system, it would be interesting to have more than 2 N C i (in fact an arbitrary number w) such that the knowledge of the data may only be obtained if one gains access to all the w NC i and otherwise get no more than random numbers. Furthermore in order to be useful, the complexity must stay linear with w In this section, we describe the secure operators generalized to w non colluding sites N C i and we focus on the most important protocols: SEN D S , S , ¬ S and S .
Sending data to the w NC i : SEN D S In the original case, for sending a data D to N C 1 , N C 2 , sites must generate a random number R and send D ⊕ R to N C 1 and R to N C 2 (or vice versa). This method could be generalized to w sites N C i by generating w − 1 random numbers, by calculating
.. V w = R w and then by sending one V 1 to each site N C j in any order. As in the original case, each N C j obtains only random numbers such as D = V 1 ⊕ ... ⊕ V w . The only way to obtain information on D is by gaining access to all the N C j . If one has access to all but one, it is analogous to the N C 1 and N C 2 scenario, which has already been proven to be secure.
The ¬ S operation With w sites N C i , this operation is still analogous and simple as the one when w = 2. In order to implement it, it is sufficient that an odd number of the sites (for example only one : N C 1 ) negates their part of the value, and the other ones does nothing. There is still nothing exchanged and hence still no issues pertaining to privacy.
The
S operation Similar to the case w = 2 each site garbles its own part of the data (X i and Y i such that the real data is X = X 1 ⊕ ... ⊕ X w and Y = Y 1 ⊕ ... ⊕ Y w ) before sending it to P S. To do that they generate two random numbers R i to encode X i and S i to encode Y i and gets X i = X i ⊕ R i and Y i = Y i ⊕ R i which are sent to P S. They also exchange the value R = R 1 ⊕ ... ⊕ R w and S = R 1 ⊕ ... ⊕ S w between all N C i . Then P S will calculate P = (X 1 ⊕ ...⊕ X w ) (Y 1 ⊕ ...⊕ y w ) which could be written as (X ⊕ R) (Y ⊕ S). P S sends its result P to all N C i by using the SEN D S protocol. Now all N C i get a value P i and they only need to remove garbled terms (X ∧ S), (Y ∧ R) and (R ∧ S). To do that, it is sufficient that an odd number of N C i (for example : N C 1 ) perform Z i = P i ⊕ (X i ∧ S) ⊕ (Y i ∧ R) ⊕ (S ∧ R) and all other ones perform Z i = P i ⊕ (X i ∧ S) ⊕ (Y i ∧ R). We then obtain the expected results such that Z = Z 1 ⊕ ... ⊕ Z w = X ∧ Y . The number of operation performed by each site (real operations / random numbers generation / data sending and receiving) will increase linearly with the number of N C i (w) and thus the full secure processing still remains linear compared to the unsecured one.
S operation The generalization of the Sum S algorithm is described in Algorithm 8. Its complexity increases linearly with the number w of N C i and remains linear compared to the same unsecured process. 1a One of the sites (for example NC1) will generate w random vectors of bits (R1...Rn) of same size such that card(Ri) ≥ 2 * N . 1b It calculates R = R1 ⊕ ... ⊕ Rw and Nr the number of bits equal to 1 in R. 1c R and Nr are sent to all NCi. 1. A permutation ϕ is chosen to permute card(R) + card(X) bits. 2. Each NCi reorder its vector (Xi, Ri) using the permutation ϕ and gets Yi. 3. Each NCi sends its Yi to P S. 4. P S calculates Y = Y1 ⊕ ... ⊕ Yw and counts the number of bits at 1 and gets NB. 5. P S generates w − 1 random numbers RPi and calculates N1 = NB + RP1, N2 = NB + RP2 − RP1 ... Nw−1 = NB + RPw−1 − RPw−2 and Nw = NB − RPw−1. 6. P S sends one of the Ni to each NCj in any order. 7. NC1 computes NB1 = N1 − NR, all other NCi keeps only NBi = Ni.
Remark: all additions and substraction are done modulo card(Y ) = card(R) + card(X).
Conclusion
In this paper we have addressed the problem of privacy preserving sequential pattern mining in the context of distributed databases. We have presented a novel secure extension of the SPAM algorithm for mining patterns. We also prove, that under reasonable assumptions, our algorithm and the underlying operations, protocols and architecture for multiparty computation is secure.
There are various avenues for future work. Firstly, in this paper we have only focused on the S-step process of the SPAM algorithm, i.e. we only considered the problem of discovering sequences reduced to a list of items. The proposed secure functions can also be extended to the I-step process, i.e. a list of itemsets instead of items. Furthermore, in the current version of PriPSep, results are directly returned to the DM party. In order to improve the whole process, we plan to extend the role of DM wherein, it could store the lexicographic tree and could expand each node in the tree by considering that intermediate results could be stored in shared arrays between N C 1 and N C 2 . Hence, incremental mining could be possible and unlike our current approach, previous results do not have to be recomputed. The storage of results would also be made secure by ensuring that each site has only noisy data or random values. In addition, as the volume of data increases to a deluge, it becomes increasingly expensive (sometimes impossible) to store all available data before processing them and hence it is necessary to process it "on the fly" as streams of data. Several new applications directly generate streams of data produced by a large number of sensors (e.g., supermarket transactions, medical data). In order to address this increase of available data, for which the privacy issue could also be very important, new research work is being done to apply data mining methods such as sequential patterns mining directly on the streams without storing them [32] .Lastly, as network traffic data becomes more relevant in the context of detection of Internet worms and intrusions by discovering abnormal traffic patterns, recent research is trying to solve the problem whilst preserving privacy of customers [33] . In sum, research in privacy preserving data mining, especially sequential patterns is at an exciting stage, with new papers laying shaping the future for the field.
